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1956] RECENT DECISIONS 865 
LABOR LAW-COLLECTIVE BARGAINING-DUTY OF EMPLOYER TO ALLOW 
UNION TIME STUDY-A dispute arose between the employer and the union 
as to whether certain duties performed by an employee should be clas-
sified as "special assignments" as defined in the labor contract. If these 
duties were "special assignments" the employee was entitled to a higher 
job classification. Before arrangements could be made for the third step 
of the grievance procedure the union asked for permission to enter the 
plant and analyze the job. Permission was denied by the management and 
the union filed a charge of unlawful refusal to bargain. The trial examiner 
found that by refusing the union's request the employer had violated sec-
tions 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (5) of the amended National Labor Relations Act.1 
On consideration by the Board, held, since there was no evidence of any 
dispute as to the duties performed by the employee but only as to the 
classification of these duties, the union had no right to enter the plant 
and make a time study. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. No. 
105, 36 L.R.R.M. 1416 (1955). 
The Board has consistently held that there are certain types of informa-
tion which the employer must furnish to the union.2 Thus, if any informa-
tion possessed by the employer is relevant to collective bargaininlf or 
would aid the union in policing the labor contract,4 a refusal to make it 
known to the union is a violation of section 8 (a) (5). It is also agreed that 
an employer violates section 8 (a) (I) if he denies union officials access to 
company property when the refusal unreasonably impedes the free ex-
lLabor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 140, 141, 29 U.S.C. (1952) 
§158 (a) (1) (5). 
2 Among the cases in which the NLRB has required employers to furnish information 
to the union are: Electric Auto-Lite Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1192 (1950) (merit ratings); Mont-
gomery Ward and Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1244 (1950) (merit ratings); Stilley Plywood Co., 94 
N.L.R.B. 932 (1951) (job classifications and rates). 
3 Aluminum Ore Co. v. NLRB, (7th Cir. 1942) 131 F. (2d) 485; NLRB v. Leland-
Gifford Co., (1st Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 620. 
4Hastings and Sons Publishing Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 708 (1953). 
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ercise of the rights guaranteed employees by the act.5 There is a sub-
stantial difference in the burden of proof involved in the two cases. If 
the union seeks wage information, it need only show the relevance6 of 
that information, but if it seeks access it must show unreasonable employer 
interference with the free exercise of employee rights.7 Two of the 
majority members considered the principal case a right-of-access problem 
while the two dissenters felt that the union's demand should have been 
treated as a request for information. Although Member Rodgers con-
sidered the case more closely analogous to the wage information cases than 
to the right-of-access cases~ he felt that since there was no evidence of a 
dispute as to the specific duties the employee performed, there was no 
reason to allow union personnel to enter the plant and make their own 
time study.8 Since the dispute concerned the job classification which the 
. collective bargaining contract gave the employee, it is obvious that in-
formation concerning his duties was relevant to the dispute. It is not so 
obvious why the union should have the right to come onto the company's 
property and make a time study of the job without showing that the in-
formation in their possession was erroneous or incomplete and, if this were 
the case, without requesting the employer to provide a more detailed 
description of the employee's duties.9 The dissenting view would give the 
union this right at any time and under any circumstances, unless the em-
ployer could show that the resulting disruption in production and dis-
cipline would make the union request unreasonable. Requiring the em-
ployer to make such a showing before he could :nefuse to let union officials 
on his property seems unjustifiable. Traditionally, the owners of private 
property have had the power to exclude anyone they wished from their 
property, including union officers. Under its established national labor 
policy, Congress did not attempt to eliminate the rights of the property 
5 Thus, access was allowed tci company property in W. T. Carter and Brother, 90 
N.L.R..B. 2020 (1950) (company-owned towns); Weyerhauser Timber Co., 31 N.L.R.B. 258 
(1941) (lumber camps); American-West African Lines, 21 NL.R..B. 691 (1940) (ships). 
6 In Hearst Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 36 L.R..R.M. 1454 (1955), the Board held 
that a union's right to receive relevant information can be waived either expressly or 
impliedly by the contract and in Oregon Coast Operations Assn., 113 NL.R.B. No. 127, 
36 L.R.R.M. 1448 (1955), the Board used the term "basic information" and implied that 
there was information which, though relevant, was not basic and that the union had no 
statutory right to other than basic information. The type of information listed in the 
cases cited in note 2 supra and the type desired in the principal case would qualify as 
basic information. 
7 Although the Board has never expressly stated that it was necessary to prove un-
reasonable interference before access to company property will be allowed, it is notable 
that in those cases where access to company property has been allowed the Board did find 
unreasonable interference with employee rights. See the cases cited in note 5 supra • 
• 8 During the processing of the grievance there had been no controversy as to the type 
of duties performed by the employee but only as to the classification which these duties 
warranted. 
9 The dissent felt that the mere fact that the union wanted to conduct a time ·study 
was sufficient evidence that there was a dispute as to the duties performed by the em-
ploy~ even though there was no other evidence of such a dispute. 
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owner but only to curtail the employer's property rights when they con-
flicted with the declared rights of employees. It follows that before the 
Board should require the employer to give up a traditional property right, 
the employee must show that this is necessary in order to safeguard one of 
his declared rights. This is the gist of the Board's decision in the principal 
case. There is no denial of necessary information to the union, nor is the 
union required to use unreasonable and expensive methods of acquiring 
the information.10 The Board has said only that when they feel the union 
already possesses the necessary information, the union has no basis for 
claiming a right to come on the company premises to secure this informa-
tion in a different manner.11 
Paul A. Heinen, S.Ed. 
10 The NLRB has previously held that an employer's refusal to furnish information 
regarding wages is not excused by the fact that the union could conceivably acquire this 
information by the cumbersome and time-consuming process of consulting individually 
with all the employees. B. F. Goodrich Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1151 (1950). 
11A prior Board decision, Otis Elevator Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 770 (1953), held that an 
employer had to allow a separate time study by the union, but in view of the subsequent 
circuit court ruling in NLRB v. Otis Elevator Co., (2d Cir. 1953) 208 F. (2d) 176, which 
enforced that portion of the Board's order requiring the employer to furnish the union 
with the results of his time study but refused to enforce the portion requiring the em-
ployer to allow the union to make its own time study, the Board was justified in not 
considering itself bound by its prior decision. 
